justice criterion' (DJC). The DJC gives us an order of priority between innocent parties. The question is: should the DJC be restricted to allocations involving innocent parties or should it apply to those responsible for the scarcity too? Should the allocation of spare organs ignore all questions of fault, or should considerations of rectificatory justice enter when at least one of the patients in need is responsible for the scarcity? Rectificatory justice covers both punishment and reparation for wrongs, and in law is to be found both in the criminal and civil law, for example in torts and contract (2).
Historical fault There are those who hold that the DJC should command all allocation simply on the ground that the question of responsibility never arises. Michael Lockwood, for example, expresses scepticism about
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Fault; allocation; organs; restitution. free will: '... we are all of us victims of our genetic inheritance, upbringing and so forth, and ... it is not true that people who bring certain kinds of health care need on themselves -for example by driving dangerously, overeating, smoking or abusing drugs or alcohol -really could, in the final analysis, have acted any differently' (3). This is not the place to discuss the issue of free will and responsibility. But, whether we believe in free will or not, we need to discuss its implications, and Lockwood has not addressed these. Our everyday practice of morality and law certainly does distinguish between people who are at fault and those who are not. The cloth out of which that everyday practice weaves culpability is made up of intention and foresight, knowledge of right and wrong, rationality, control over one's actions and emotions, beliefs about the circumstances of the action and a capacity to exercise reasonable care about others. For those who wish to reserve judgement on free will our question still stands: if a person is responsible for a shortage of healthy organs, should their access be determined wholly by distributive criteria or should rectificatory justice (punishment or reparation) be involved?
In a recent article proposing a complete criterion of allocation, Michael J Langford distinguishes between past fault, which his proposed criterion excludes as ground for allocation, and a present or future condition, for example alcoholism, which could ground allocation 'if it rendered the medical prognosis poor' (4). However, he does not provide any reason why past fault should be excluded. Now for our purposes it may just be the case that Langford has successfully delineated the DJC.
Indeed, exclusion of historical fault would be definitionally required, for it would exclude questions of rectificatory justice. But it would plainly beg the question arbitrarily to exclude rectificatory criteria from a complete criterion of allocation: that requires argument.
It is, however, possible to reconstruct a line of reasoning that may have influenced Langford. He believes that a principle of equality should govern his criterion, and, he claims 'that certainly looks like a deontological principle' (4), by which he means 'one that relates to rights and duties that are alleged to apply regardless of the consequences' (5). However, it emerged that he is not defending a deontological principle since he is elaborating a principle to which deontologists, utilitarians (who are interested in only the consequences) and those uncommitted to an ethical theory may subscribe (4). But there is no such neutral principle. It is only utilitarianism which, at base, wholly rejects the moral significance of the past. It is only utilitarianism which would find no possible role for historical fault in a complete principle of allocation: deontology and ordinary morality commonly base judgements of desert, entitlement and liability on past fault of one of the parties involved.
It might also be the case that Langford believes that including rectificatory criteria turns scarce resource allocation into punishment. To that argument I now turn.
A non-punitive principle of restitution Self-inflicted harm is not a crime A second reason for rejecting preferential treatment as punishment lies in the fact that self-inflicted harm is not a crime. Damaging one's own heart or lungs by smoking is not forbidden by law: it would be legal paternalism if it were. So the justification, if there is one, for discriminating against a smoker when only one healthy spare set of heart and lungs is available must be non-punitive. And that justification lies in restitution. For suppose that what the smoker who is at fault must do is to restore to others what was rightfully theirs before the commission of the fault. True, the smoker has inflicted harm on only himself. But this ceases to be true if he does not forfeit equality of entitlement to a spare set of heart and lungs. For example, if there is no forfeiture of equality then, the one non-smoker in need of a transplant has a 1/2 chance of acquiring the spare set rather than a 1/1 chance. Without differential treatment according to fault the non-smoker would be denied his rightful opportunity. By forfeiting his own right to equality the smoker restores the nonsmoker to her rightful status quo.
Interestingly, much of this argument applies to someone who damages another's healthy heart or who vandalises one of the two healthy spare sets of organs available (8) . The obvious difference is that a crime has now been committed -harm to the person or damage to property: punishment is a matter for the criminal courts. But, in addition to the crime, we have the same kind of situation that arose with selfinflicted harm: there is a scarcity of resources. By harming another's heart, or by vandalising a spare set of organs on their way to the theatre, the person at fault has forfeited his right to equal priority with the innocent patient. The threat may be current But historical fault may be found in self-defence. The threat may be current, but the fault may be historical (9) . Imagine the aggressor has pushed his trolley to the crest of the hill and has now tied himself in it so that he cannot jump out: you are tied to the track down which the trolley is heading and fortunately you can operate by remote control a bulldozer which, at the flick of the switch, will straddle the track, protect you but kill the aggressor when his trolley smashes into it. The fault is historical in the sense that after the trolley has crested the hill, the aggressor can do nothing more about it, and flight or effective threats are not open to the victim. This is unlike the current fault of an aggressor who is trying to strangle you and in whose power it is to desist right up to the moment of the victim's death. In this case both the threat and the fault are current. But the burden of restitution is the same in both cases. Indeed, it is not inappropriate to ask, in the present tense, 'Who is responsible?' in both cases of historical and current fault.
We now have a non-punitive principle of restitution. It We must now distinguish between being responsible for a condition and being at fault or culpable for that condition arising. For there to be a fault there must be a wrong committed as well as there being responsibility for that wrong. A miner or fireman chooses freely to subject himself to greater risk of harm or disease than is met with in most occupations. And, on the special assumption that if he were not to make that choice nobody would fill his place, it may be true that he causes a shortfall in spare healthy organs. But, because of the social value placed upon such occupations, we are not tempted to say that such a shortfall is the fault of the miner or the fireman. Since there is no fault there can be no case for saying that miners should have less priority than those who have no responsibility for their condition. But why should the social value of the occupations involving these risks mean that no fault occurs? The justification lies in fairness. In this case the value is one of social need: the society needs firemen and miners for its welfare. To ask people to take an extra risk (which may be rewarded by danger money) and then to give them lower medical priority than any ordinary member of the public would simply be unfair: indeed there is a case for giving them a higher medical priority in addition to danger money.
One qualification should be made here. The society asks people in dangerous occupations to take only the risks that are reasonable in the circumstances. Negligence can incur harm that was reasonably avoidable. Society did not ask the miner to harm himself in that way.
Dangerous sports
Dangerous sports such as rock-climbing and paragliding are not pursued out of social necessity since they do not contribute to social welfare. Society does not ask people to engage in rock-climbing or paragliding. If people freely engage in these sports should they not pay all the extra costs such activities risk and so receive a lower priority in access to spare organs? The argument with smoking is that it is unfair to spread the extra risks of this self-indulgence to those who prefer not to impose an extra risk on themselves. Should not the same apply to dangerous sports? A strong case can be made here for the social value of such sports, providing they are not too dangerous, and providing they are practised nonnegligently. The value does not belong to social welfare, it is not socially necessary as has been stated. But these sports do enhance lives as well as endanger them. Their value is both intrinsic and extrinsic. Intrinsically, skills of a very high order can be acquired, with an accompanying feeling of achievement; but even beginners find the activity exciting and challenging. Yet it is also a spectator sport, in the sense that it can be followed with binoculars or cameras and be read about. Extrinsically, the activity is character-forming as well as being able to provide the best exponents with a living. Activities of this kind thus become a part of our culture and their value contributes to a worthwhile life. After all, social welfare is not an end in itself: it simply enables us to choose and pursue a worthwhile life.
Moral complicity
Do dangerous sports differ in important respects from smoking or hard drinking? I think it is easy to show that our society delivers a mixed message on this issue. On the one hand, it permits advertising and sponsorship which may target children, and which presents smoking and drinking as appendages to a glamorous life-style. And, on the whole, it does not restrict smoking very seriously in public places, even when the dangers of passive smoking are well known. Such a policy seems to countenance the sharing of risks between smokers and the general public. On the other hand, government health warnings are compulsory on packets and advertisements. I think the upshot of this is that our society may be charged with moral complicity in the tobacco companies' operations and in the smokers' selfinfliction of harm. Part of the message is that there is no fault: the other part of the message is that the activity is dangerous. When combined, these messages are compatible with the claim that smoking is a valuable (chic, cool) way of living in which it would be fair that we should all, smokers and non-smokers alike, bear the costs equally in the case of access to medical care: it would be unjust if non-smokers were given priority.
The claim that smoking is socially valuable should be challenged. One Lockwood may be right about this particular consequence, at least in the vast majority of cases. Few are likely to be made more responsible by a rectificatory response to their fault. But he ignores the possibility that a system of equal access for all alike might induce many to become more irresponsible about their health. This is a phenomenon that occurs in the field of safety measures (12) . For example, if seat-belts are made compulsory there is a tendency for drivers to drive faster and so restore the former accident rates.
To conclude: rectificatory but non-punitive justice has in principle a role to play in the allocation of scarce medical resources. However, this would be just only within a framework of robust preventive medicine: this would mean effective health education and the elimination of cigarette advertising and sponsorship.
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